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directed toward an identifiable group of victims: cheerleaders. Even 
though the speech is targeted at a group of students, the speech must 
be unwelcome and interfere with at least one individual out of such 
group in order to constitute cyberbullying. 
It bears repeating that school districts must carefully balance all 
four factors of this proposed test. Indeed, the crux of this test is- the 
requirement that schools weigh each factor equally. Only then can we 
protect the victims of cyberbullying while upholding students' free-
dom of speech. 
CONCLUSION 
The four-factor sliding scale test proposed in this Note is a practi-
cal method for resolving the unique problem of cyberbullying facing 
schools today. This test provides enough flexibility to apply to differ-
ent scenarios within the ever-expanding social network scene, while 
also ensuring consistent application within school communities and 
lower courts. Furthermore, the test incorporates well-accepted and 
well-defined principles from Title VII and Title IX while preserving 
the policy underpinnings of the Tinker tetralogy. 
Most importantly, this test is designed to protect the victim by 
providing an avenue of recourse before the damage from cyberbully-
ing becomes irreparable. Indeed, as the Harris Court made clear, "Ti-
tle VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nerv-
ous breakdown."186 The same is true of this proposed test. The cases 
of Megan Meier and Tyler Clementi187 are tragic reminders of what 
can happen when a cyberbully' s psychological torment proceeds un-
checked. This test serves as a preventive tool. It empowers students 
and schools alike to take action before the victim becomes tomorrow's 
next tragic headline. 
186 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
187 See supra Part I. 
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"[W] e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prej-
udicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for 
the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, 
and the reward of their ingenuity and labor; the other, that the world 
may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be 
retarded. "1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, high technology has been a significant 
driver of economic growth in the United States. 2 Businesses are in-
creasingly turning to patented technology and innovation to streamline 
operations, boost output, or reach new markets. 3 However, few firms 
develop their own technology for internal use only, and technological 
development frequently relies on the inventions of others. Rather, 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
B.A., University of Colorado at Boulder. The author would like to thank Professor 
Jacqueline D. Lipton for her suggestions on earlier drafts, and Thomas A. Piraino, Jr. 
for his invaluable instruction in Antitrust Law and guidance in the drafting of this 
Note. All mistakes are the author's alone. 
1 Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (K.B.) (Lord Mansfield, 
C.J.). 
2 Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technolo-
gy Competition, 44 WM. & MARYL. REv. 65, 67 (2002) [hereinafter High Technology 
Competition]; Jacob M. Schlesinger, Greenspan Warns on Productivity Gains-Fed 
Chairman Says Benefits From High Technology Could Soon Reach Limit, WALL ST. 
J., June 15, 1999, at A2 (discussing Alan Greenspan's comments on the role that high 
technology has played in U.S. economic growth in the 1990s: cutting production costs 
in almost every economic sector, boosting output, and restraining price increases). 
3 See Matt Murray & Raju Narisetti, Bank Mergers' Hidden Engine: Tech-
nology, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at Bl (discussing the impact of high technology 
on banks' operations). 
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licensing plays a critical role in facilitating the development and ap-
plication of technology to various businesses and industries. 4 Innova-
tors in high technology who license their patented innovations rely, in 
part, on patent protection when implementing, disseminating, or de-
veloping their technology for various applications or processes. 5 A 
key tool in protecting patent rights is the grantback clause, also known 
as the improvement clause. Grantback clauses allow licensors to pre-
vent licensees from displacing their patents from the marketplace 
through improvements that the licensee may independently practice. 6 
But grantback clauses raise important antitrust concerns that fed-
eral courts, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of 
Justice (the "Agencies") have attempted to regulate over the last half 
century. Generally, courts and the Agencies have treated grantback 
clauses as potential contracts in restraint of trade under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 7 the legality of which is determined through one of 
two analytical frameworks called the per se rule and the "rule of rea-
son."8 
The central claim of this Note is that neither framework in its tra-
ditional form is correct for analyzing grantback clauses in patent li-
cense agreements. Courts appropriately barred the per se rule from the 
4 See, e.g., Rodney Ho, Patents Hit Record in '98 as Tech Firms Rushed to 
Protect Intellectual Property, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1999, at A2 (stating that "IBM 
pulled in more than $1 billion in licensing fees [in 1998] from 1,600 different compa-
nies."). 
5 Id. ("The number of patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office is skyrocketing as giant technology companies scrable to shelter their intellec-
tual property in today's tech-crazed marketplace."). 
6 See, e.g. Kenneth J. Dow & Traci Dreher Quigley, Improvements for Han-
dling Improvement Clauses in IP Licenses: An Analytical Framework, 20 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 577, 582 (2004) (describing a particular grant-
back clause as requiring "any improvements made on the apparatus or process" as 
belonging to the original patent holder of the apparatus or process); Barry Rein, Per-
mission Granted, MACHINE DESIGN, Mar. 7, 1996, at 143 ("Many licenses ... have 
grantback provisions in which a company licenses a technology in exchange for 
granting back to the licensor rights to use any technology it develops."). 
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."). 
8 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 
(1940) (describing the per se rule as an automatic prohibition of certain conduct, such 
as horizontal price-fixing and territorial restraints, because no business justification 
could vindicate its anticompetitive effects); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (introducing the rule ofreason to antitrust analysis, and 
requiring that under the rule, courts only strike down unreasonable restraints on trade 
as determined through a holistic view of the relevant market, and balancing anticom-
petitive effects of the restraint with procompetitive effects). 
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grantback context over sixty years ago, 9 but it has had a few resurgent 
moments since. The per se rule, however, fails to appreciate the sig-
nificant procompetitive effects grantback clauses have in high tech-
nology competition. 10 The rule of reason, on the other hand, is a nebu-
lous and often imprecise approach to agreements spawning from dif-
ferent markets with different motivations. 11 Also, the rule of reason 
often requires great expense for the litigating parties, as well as for the 
courts or Agencies analyzing the challenged contracts. 12 Finally, the 
current form of the rule of reason does not appropriately account for 
the unique dynamics of high technology markets that licensing parties 
must consider in making accurate and economically beneficial deci-
• 13 
SlOnS. 
This Note proposes that federal courts and the Agencies should 
create a more tailored approach to analyzing potential anticompetitive 
effects of grantback clauses in patent license agreements. 14 Rather 
than mechanically applying the rule of reason-or contemplating a 
return to the per se rule-courts and the Agencies should carefully 
analyze the context in which the grantback clause exists. 
Instead, every patent license agreement can be treated as a joint 
venture since license agreements generally contemplate two or more 
entities collaborating, through contract for the furtherance of some 
commercial objective. 15 Joint ventures exist either upstream or down-
stream of the relevant market. In other words, a joint venture exists 
either for the collection and development of raw materials or the pro-
duction, marketing, or sale to consumers of some product already de-
veloped from raw materials. 16 Patent license agreements are similar: 
the patented technology is licensed either to assist in the development 
of new products, technologies, or processes from raw materials, or the 
production of the same to be placed in the market. 17 
The anticompetitive effect of grantback clauses in such license 
agreements truly depends on which type of joint venture the license 
(1947). 
9 See Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co, 329 U.S. 637 
10 See infra Part III.A. 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 See infra Part III.B. 
13 See infra Part III. 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 See infra Part IV. 
16 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collabora-
tions Among Competitors, 86 low AL. REV. 113 7, 1171 (2001) [hereinafter Collabo-
rations] ("Joint ventures may be formed at the purchasing, research and development, 
production, or marketing stages of the production cycle."). 
17 See infra Part IV. 
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agreement contemplates. Upstream joint ventures are inherently less 
anticompetitive and more procompetitive because they are further 
from the marketplace, increase innovation and collaboration, and gen-
erally do not restrain the joint venturers from competing with one 
another outside of the joint venture. 18 Downstream joint ventures have 
a much higher potential for anticompetitive effects for the converse 
reasons: they are closer to the market and are thus more likely to re-
strain output and induce monopolistic or cartelistic behavior.19 Thus, 
courts and the Agencies should evaluate the legality of grantback 
clauses based upon the type of joint venture in which they exist, and 
determine whether the grantback would change the presumption of 
legality in an upstream joint venture, or further the anticompetitive 
potential in a downstream joint venture. 20 This proposed contextual 
analysis would reduce the overly-broad market analysis required by 
the traditional rule of reason, and act as a shortcut to the bottom-line 
inquiry of every antitrust suit: "whether or not the challenged restraint 
nh . . ,,21 e ances competlt10n. 
Part I of this Note discusses the background of patent license 
agreements and grantback clauses. Part II then discusses the historical 
antitrust treatment of grantback clauses by federal courts and the 
Agencies, focusing specifically on the seminal case Transparent-
Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. 22 and its progeny. Part III 
argues that the traditional per se rule and the rule of reason are inap-
propriate for grantback clauses in patent license agreements because 
of the unique structure of high technology markets, the misunder-
standing of grantback clauses' procompetitive effects inherent in the 
per se rule, and the unduly burdensome and unnecessary expense that 
the rule of reason requires. Finally, Part IV suggests that courts and 
the Agencies reshape their traditional rule of reason analysis and take 
a more nuanced look at whether the challenged grantback clause ex-
ists in an upstream or downstream joint venture, and whether the 
18 See Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1178 (describing upstream joint 
ventures as not being close to the marketplace and therefore being less likely to cause 
anticompetitive effects). 
19 See Id. (describing how "joint ventures at the production and marketing 
stages have the greatest potential to cause anticompetitive effects."). 
20 See Id. at 117 6-78 (articulating the correct process by which courts should 
analyze the legality of joint ventures). 
21 See California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-80 (1999) 
("Whether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption [under the per se rule] 
or actual market analysis [under the rule ofreason], the essential inquiry remains the 
same-whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition.") (quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
22 329 U.S. 637 (1947). 
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clause has a beneficial or adverse effect on the joint venture's anti-
competitive analysis. 
I. BACKGROUND ON GRANTBACK CLAUSES IN PATENT 
LICENSE AGREEMENTS 
A patent is a government-created, legal right to the exclusive pos-
session of an invention. 23 Those who invent new and useful devices, 
machinery, or processes are granted a right to exclude all others from 
using or practicing those inventions. 24 Therefore, patent protection 
encourages innovation. 25 In exchange for the disclosure of novel, use-
ful and nonobvious inventions,26 the United States offers the patentee 
23 A long-standing principle of patent law is that a patent does not grant a 
patentee the right to use or practice the patented invention or discovery, but only 
grants the right to exclude others from using or practicing the invention or discovery. 
See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) ("[T]he long-
settled view that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from prof-
iting by the patented invention."); Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro 
Italia SPA, 944 F.2d 870, 879 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("It is elementary that a patent 
grants only the right to exclude others and confers no right on its holder to make, use, 
or sell."); 1 MoY'S WALKER ON PATENTS§ 1:1 (4th ed. 2010); AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 19 (2007) (dis-
cussing the history and modem usage of the term "patent."). 
24 See 3 5 U.S. C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title."). 
25 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 
(1989) ("The federal patent system ... embodies a carefully crafted bargain for en-
couraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in 
technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a 
period of years."). Innovation is at the heart of both intellectual property law and, less 
directly, antitrust law, and is perhaps the only reason that these bodies of law harmo-
nize. Courts and the Agencies early considered intellectual property law and antitrust 
law incompatible with each other because the former granted rights of exclusion, 
while the later sought to eliminate exclusive conduct that harmed competition. See 
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(noting that "the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at 
encouraging innovation, industry and competition"); Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2000) 
(describing that courts and enforcement agencies once believed that intellectual prop-
erty law and antitrust law had an adversarial relationship, but that this belief is now 
outdated); Azam H. Aziz, Defining Technology and Innovation Markets: The DOJ's 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 
475, 482 (1995) (submitting that "a thorough analysis of the underlying reasoning 
behind each set of laws reveals that both intellectual property privileges and antitrust 
statutes share the common goal of increasing competition and innovation."). 
26 The Patent and Trademark Office awards patents only to those inventions 
that are new, that have a minimum level of efficacy such that one "skilled in the art" 
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(one who obtains a patent) a right to control and use the results of its 
labor for a limited period of time. 27 Without an exclusive right to 
make, use, or sell an invention for commercial benefit, society could 
.c. l . . 2s expect .tewer peop e to mvent or mnovate. 
Therefore, a patent's value is largely in the patentee's exclusive 
right to practice and disseminate its technology or process. But, this 
exclusive power may be taken from the patentee in several ways. The 
most obvious end of a patentee's exclusive right over its invention or 
discovery is the patent's expiration. Under current law, utility and 
plant patents expire twenty years after the date when the patent is 
filed. 29 Design patents-which protect new, original, and ornamental 
design for a physical good-are awarded for fourteen years, measured 
from the date the patent is granted. 30 
The development of improvements or substitutes for a patented 
invention may also weaken a patent's exclusivity right. Because pa-
tented inventions become public knowledge after a patent application 
is filed, any interested party may modify or alter the invention to im-
prove upon it or substitute it altogether, and may obtain a separate 
patent for the improvement. 31 In fact, competitors are often incentiv-
ized to do so when the invention is an important asset in a competitive 
may use the invention without much difficulty, and that advance on prior technology 
in more than an obvious direction. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, ROBERT CLARE 
HIGHLEY, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATEN LAW BASICS § 8.2 
(2011). 
27 See Patlex Corp. v. Mossingho:ff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) ("The basic right concomitant to the grant of a patent is the right of exclusivity 
founded in the Constitution .... The encouragement of investment-based risk is the 
fundamental purpose of the patent grant, and is based directly on the right to ex-
clude."). 
28 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (discussing the 
important role patent law has in inducing innovation and invention of novel, useful, 
and nonobvious technology or systems); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The 
Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590 (2011) (discussing how 
the inducement standard of patent law serves as an economic cornerstone of patent 
law). 
29 35 U.S.C. §§ 154-157, 163 (2006). 
30 Id.§§ 171-173. 
31 See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 429 (1822) (The patent "also gives 
to any inventor of an improvement in the principle of any machine, or in the process 
of any composition of matter which has been patented, an exclusive right to 
a patent for his improvement; but [the inventor of an improvement] is not to be at 
liberty to use the original discovery, nor is the first inventor at liberty to use the im-
provement."). See also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellec-
tual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 991 (1997) ("Improvers are free to use mate-
rial that is in the public domain ... by 'designing around'.the claims of a patent."). 
ANTITRUST AND PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 305 
marketplace. 32 Alternatively, improvements may be made when a 
patentee licenses its patent to others for a particular use, and the licen-
sor discovers or creates an improvement on the original patent. 33 Pa-
tent holders grant licenses for several reasons: to earn a royalty on the 
use of their invention by others; to combine their technology with the 
technology of another in a joint venture context; or "because they do 
not have the resources to achieve full commercial exploitation of their 
intellectual property themselves."34 
Consequently, a patentee has an obvious interest in controlling 
any improvements on its patented technology or process developed by 
other parties. 35 Where a patentee licenses its invention to a third party, 
it will often include a grantback clause in the license agreement, re-
quiring the licensee to "grant back" to the patentee some or all rights 
to any improvements made upon the original patent. 36 A grantback 
provision often acts as partial consideration for the right to license the 
patented technology. 37 Without such consideration, a patentee may 
32 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 1005 ("Trying something new in the hope of 
improving on an existing product or process is an integral part of the competitive 
process."). See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
160 (1989) ("The duplication of boat hulls and their component parts may be an es-
sential part of innovation in the field of hydrodynamic design. Variations as to size 
and combination of various elements may lead to significant advances in the field. 
Reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public domain often 
leads to significant advances in technology. If Florida may prohibit this particular 
method of study and recomposition of an unpatented article, we fail to see the princi-
ple that would prohibit a State from banning the use of chromatography in the recon-
stitution ofunpatented chemical compounds, or the use of robotics in the duplication 
of machinery in the public domain. Moreover, as we noted in Kewanee, the competi-
tive reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an incen-
tive to develop inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of patentability.") 
33 See generally Jay Pil Choi, A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The "Boom-
erang" Effect and Grant-Back Clauses, 43 INT'LECON. REv. 803, 803-04 (2002) 
("Licensing is a voluntary form of dissemination whereby an inventor can enjoy at 
least some of the gains to trade by availing other parties of the use of his superior 
knowledge .... "). 
34 Id. at 803. 
35 Richard Schmalbeck, The Validity of Grant-Back Clauses in Patent Li-
censing Agreements, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 733, 733 (1975). See also PHILLIPE. AREEDA 
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ifl 782e (3rd ed. 2011) ("An important 
concern of the original patentee is the defensive one of not being pushed out of its 
own market."); Gerard F. Dunne, Anti-Competitive Considerations of Patent Accumu-
lation by Licensee Grant-Back Provisions, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 124, 129 (1975) 
("The inventor of a parent patent has an interest in preserving his access to technolog-
ical improvements in his field."). 
36 See, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 35 ("A so-called grantback tenn in a patent 
license requires the licensee to convey to the original patentee rights under any im-
provement patent made by the licensee on the licensed invention."). 
37 Schmalbeck, supra note 35. 
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(one who obtains a patent) a right to control and use the results of its 
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invention may also weaken a patent's exclusivity right. Because pa-
tented inventions become public knowledge after a patent application 
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patent for the improvement. 31 In fact, competitors are often incentiv-
ized to do so when the invention is an important asset in a competitive 
may use the invention without much difficulty, and that advance on prior technology 
in more than an obvious direction. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, ROBERT CLARE 
HIGHLEY, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATEN LAW BASICS § 8.2 
(2011). 
27 See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) ("The basic right concomitant to the grant of a patent is the right of exclusivity 
founded in the Constitution .... The encouragement of investment-based risk is the 
fundamental purpose of the patent grant, and is based directly on the right to ex-
clude."). 
28 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (discussing the 
important role patent law has in inducing innovation and invention of novel, useful, 
and nonobvious technology or systems); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The 
Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590 (2011) (discussing how 
the inducement standard of patent law serves as an economic cornerstone of patent 
law). 
29 35 U.S.C. §§ 154-157, 163 (2006). 
30 Id. §§ 171-173. 
31 See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 429 (1822) (The patent "also gives 
to any inventor of an improvement in the principle of any machine, or in the process 
of any composition of matter which has been patented, an exclusive right to 
a patent for his improvement; but [the inventor of an improvement] is not to be at 
liberty to use the original discovery, nor is the first inventor at liberty to use the im-
provement."). See also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellec-
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rial that is in the public domain ... by 'designing around'. the claims of a patent."). 
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other parties. 35 Where a patentee licenses its invention to a third party, 
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leads to significant advances in technology. If Florida may prohibit this particular 
method of study and recomposition of an unpatented article, we fail to see the princi-
ple that would prohibit a State from banning the use of chromatography in the recon-
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of machinery in the public domain. Moreover, as we noted in Kewanee, the competi-
tive reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an incen-
tive to develop inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of patentability. ") 
33 See generally Jay Pil Choi, A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The "Boom-
erang" Effect and Grant-Back Clauses, 43 INT'L ECON. REV. 803, 803-04 (2002) 
("Licensing is a voluntary form of dissemination whereby an inventor can enjoy at 
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find itself "pushed out of its own market. "38 For example, "a patentee 
licenses product patent A; by practicing the invention, the licensee 
learns how to do it better and obtains product patent B. If the im-
provement is significant, it may destroy any market for the patentee's 
original product. "39 
Grantback clauses vary from one license agreement to another-
they are purely contractual obligations between parties-but have 
some general commonalities. Grantback clauses may include: a) a 
nonexclusive license with or without royalties flowing to either the 
licensor or licensee to practice the improvement; b) an exclusive li-
cense to use or sublicense the improvement; or c) an all-out assign-
ment of the improved technology, which is usually patented separately 
by the licensee, "without any right reserved for the [licensee]."40 Un-
der a nonexclusive license agreement, both the licensor and licensee 
may practice the improvement and license it to others. 41 Under an 
exclusive license, the licensor may practice the improvement and li-
cense it to others, but the licensee may only practice the improvement. 
It may not license it to others. Finally, under a complete assignment, 
the licensee may not practice the improvement at all except by a se-
cond license from the original licensor. 42 
General commentary views grantbacks as both beneficial and det-
rimental to competitive markets and innovation. They are beneficial in 
that they incentivize the dissemination of important technology.43 For 
example, the patentee is encouraged to license its technology if it is 
reasonably certain that it will not be driven from the market by subse-
quent improvements. The patentee may realize this benefit in two 
ways: a) by having the ability to practice the improvement; orb) by 
receiving royalties when the licensee, or another third party, practices 
the improvement. However, if grantback clauses in patent license 
agreements were not available, or the law was unduly restrictive (e.g. 
requiring licensors to permit licensee's to further disseminate the im-
provements to third parties), patentees would be less likely to license 
their technology, and instead would seek other alternatives to develop 
38 
AREEDA, supra note 35. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See 2 HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LA w § 23: 1 
(2011) (stating that "absent the protection of a grant-back provision, patent owners 
may be justifiably reluctant to license their patented technology to firms that can then 
develop and exclusively retain improvement technology made possible by the licenses 
.... By removing this risk, reasonable grant-back provisions enhance the patentee's 
incentive to license, thus opening up the patented technology to additional firms."). 
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their technology, such as angel investors, venture capital incubators, 
or bank loans. 44 Thus, without grantback clauses, important technolo-
gy might not be disseminated between firms. Dissemination of tech-
nology can have important competitive effects that should not be dis-
counted, 45 particularly in high technology markets. 
As discussed in Part III below, high-technology industries are 
unique from other markets in that they progress more rapidly and tend 
to unify around a single dominant player. 46 If a dominant patentee in a 
high technology market refused to disseminate its technology because 
it could not employ a grantback clause, and thus feared being replaced 
anytime it licensed, other competitors in the market would suffer the 
most. For example, suppose a national telecommunication firm re-
fused to license new wireless technology, used in transmitting data 
between phones and computers, to third party software developers. 
Instead, the company developed its own software, or bought software-
developing firms as subsidiaries. The telecommunication firm would 
thereby maintain control over its patented technology, and resist dis-
seminating its new technology to outsiders. Such conduct would in-
crease the company's monopoly position, slow innovation, further 
concentrate the market, and erect incredibly high entry barriers to any 
firm wishing to compete with the telecommunication firm. Grantback 
clauses defuse such scenarios and benefit innovation and competition 
by promoting the spread of patented technology, indirectly disincen-
tivizing monopolistic behavior, and allowing new market entrants an 
opportunity to learn from the dominant firm in a high technology 
market. 47 
Conversely, the Agencies believe that grantback clauses could sti-
fle innovation and market competition by allowing the patentee, or 
licensor, to retain a monopoly over certain technology through the 
44 While these alternatives may require a patentee to give up certain proprie-
tary rights in its technology similar to a license agreement, there is arguably a reduced 
chance that the angel investor, venture capitalist or bank will force the patentee out of 
the market. Such financiers' economic interest is tied to the patentee's success. A 
licensee, on the other hand, may desire to compete with the patentee, or at least ad-
vance its own interests while standing on the patentee's shoulders without regard to 
whether the patentee falls in the process. 
45 See generally Lemley, supra note 31, at 998 (stating that the "rules gov-
erning improvements are important in understanding the extent to which protection 
for first-generation innovation will impede improvement in subsequent generations."). 
46 See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 74-76. 
47 See International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 551, 566 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (stating that a system oflicense agreements with grantback clauses 
"assure[ d] that improvements w[ ould] be disseminated throughout the long list of 
[defendant's] licensees" with a net effect of increasing rather than decreasing compe-
tition). 
306 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3 :2] 
find itself "pushed out of its own market."38 For example, "a patentee 
licenses product patent A; by practicing the invention, the licensee 
learns how to do it better and obtains product patent B. If the im-
provement is significant, it may destroy any market for the patentee's 
original product. "39 
Grantback clauses vary from one license agreement to another-
they are purely contractual obligations between parties-but have 
some general commonalities. Grantback clauses may include: a) a 
nonexclusive license with or without royalties flowing to either the 
licensor or licensee to practice the improvement; b) an exclusive li-
cense to use or sublicense the improvement; or c) an all-out assign-
ment of the improved technology, which is usually patented separately 
by the licensee, "without any right reserved for the [licensee ]."40 Un-
der a nonexclusive license agreement, both the licensor and licensee 
may practice the improvement and license it to others. 41 Under an 
exclusive license, the licensor may practice the improvement and li-
cense it to others, but the licensee may only practice the improvement. 
It may not license it to others. Finally, under a complete assignment, 
the licensee may not practice the improvement at all except by a se-
cond license from the original licensor. 42 
General commentary views grantbacks as both beneficial and det-
rimental to competitive markets and innovation. They are beneficial in 
that they incentivize the dissemination of important technology. 43 For 
example, the patentee is encouraged to license its technology if it is 
reasonably certain that it will not be driven from the market by subse-
quent improvements. The patentee may realize this benefit in two 
ways: a) by having the ability to practice the improvement; orb) by 
receiving royalties when the licensee, or another third party, practices 
the improvement. However, if grantback clauses in patent license 
agreements were not available, or the law was unduly restrictive (e.g. 
requiring licensors to permit licensee's to further disseminate the im-
provements to third parties), patentees would be less likely to license 
their technology, and instead would seek other alternatives to develop 
38 AREEDA, supra note 35. 
39 Id. 
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grantback, or by allowing the patentee to extend its monopoly to 
technology not within the scope of the original patent. 48 In the Anti-
trust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (the 
"Guidelines"), the Agencies state that grantbacks could reduce a li-
censee's incentive to engage in research and development when they 
know that they will not have an exclusive monopoly to the result of 
their work, but will instead have to share such results with the original 
patentee. 49 This may be especially true where improvements are as-
signed back to the original patentee, but may also occur in exclusive 
grantback agreements. 50 
From an antitrust perspective, exclusive grantback clauses are 
suspect for another reason. Because exclusive grantbacks generally 
prohibit one or all parties to a licensing agreement from further licens-
ing the improvements to other third parties, such grantbacks could 
create a barrier to entry in the market. 51 Since the patentee holds the 
original patent and the licensee holds the improvement patent, a third 
party seeking access to such technology must go to both parties and 
negotiate separate licensing agreements with differing terms of use. 52 
48 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE CoMM'N, ANT\TRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
THELICENSINGOFINTELLECTUALPROPERTY 30 (1995) [hereinifter Guidelines] (stat-
ing that grantback clauses may adversely affect competition). 
49 Id. 
50 Proving that a grantback clause reduced a licensee's incentive to innovate 
may be particularly difficult in an antitrust suit because of the unusually high stand-
ing, harm, and causation requirements of antitrust law, particularly where an innova-
tion is "inchoate at the time the restraint occurs." AREEDA, supra note 35, at~ 1782f. 
But, the argument is certainly not without precedent in other contexts of licensing 
intellectual property. See Lasercomb America v. Reynolds, 911F.2d970, 979 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (finding that a copyright licensor's requirement that the licensee of its 
software not develop any competing software was an attempt to use its copyright to 
violate basic policy of intellectual property law-the development of the arts). 
51 See AREEDA, supra note 35 (stating that third parties benefit from nonex-
clusive grantback clauses because they may license both the original-or dominant-
patent and the improvement-or subordinate-patent from any party to the original 
license agreement, reducing the cost to enter the market). 
52 See generally Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 406-07 
(1945) (finding that Hartford-Empire Co. acquired, by issue or assignment, more than 
600 patents in the glass-making industry, and restricted the use of its patented tech-
nology to outsiders by a network of agreements). See also AREEDA, supra note 35 
("To make the improved product ... one needs access to both patents .... While a 
third party could negotiate separately with the owners of each patent, transaction costs 
typically fall when one party can license both patents."). Grantback clauses may 
create a pooling effect whereby one person or entity controls a dominant patent or 
patents, and all subsequent improvements filter back to the original patentee. The 
Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States suggested that, while pooling 
patents is not per se unlawful under antitrust laws, such a practice might be an abu-
sive restraint of the market. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169 
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This situation increases the cost of contracting, complicates the nego-
tiation process, and could result in patent license agreements that do 
not parallel one another in their scope of use, thus becoming unwork-
able for the third party. 53 
Finally, the last fear of grantback clauses in patent licensing 
agreements is the idea that grantbacks "reinforce monopoly."54 This is 
particularly true where the grantback clause assigns any improvement 
patents to the patentee and prohibits the licensee from practicing or 
disseminating the improvement. This type of grantback clause can be 
especially detrimental to the marketplace where the original patent 
and improvement patent "compete" with one another, or, stated dif-
ferently, may be practiced independently. 55 Because a patent is limited 
in scope to the language of its claim, 56 a patent limits that to which the 
patentee has exclusive rights. Grantback clauses then can extend that 
exclusivity beyond what the government has recognized to other in-
novations through contract. There are justifications for this ownership 
expansion articulated by both the United States Supreme Court, dis-
cussed below in Part II, and a leading antitrust scholar. 57 But the ac-
cumulation of improvement patents by the original patentee may be a 
de facto extension of the original patent's expiration date, increasing 
the patentee's market share, and erecting a significant barrier to entry 
in the particular market. 58 Antitrust law seeks to prohibit or mitigate 
such conduct. 59 
(1931) ("Any agreement between competitors may be illegal if part of a larger plan to 
control interstate markets. Such contracts must be scrutinized to ascertain whether the 
restraints imposed are regulations reasonable under the circumstances, or whether 
their effect is to suppress or unduly restrict competition. And [patent] pooling ar-
rangements may obviously result in restricting competition."). 
53 But this problem is likely not unique to exclusive grantback clauses. 
Where a patentee doesn't license its technology at all, and instead relies on in-house 
development assisted by the "know-how" of subsidiaries and the capital of investors 
or banks, any future licensee would be inundated with vast negotiations with such 
third parties who may retain some proprietary or equity interest in the technology. 
Thus, while cost of contracting would be an important consideration in the validity of 
grantback clauses, it is not unique to grantback clauses. 
54 AREEDA, supra note 35; 2 HOLMES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ANTITRUST LAW§ 23:1 (2011). 
55 AREEDA, supra note 35. 
56 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (2002) 
("The claim defines the scope of the patent grant.") (citation omitted). 
57 See AREEDA, supra note 35 ("[S]uch cartel or monopolization scenarios 
hardly describe the typical grantback and therefore provide no ground for any cate-
gorical characterization as patent misuse or antitrust violation."). 
58 See id. ("[T]he monopoly may be extended in time or otherwise reinforced 
when grantbacks bring the dominant firm an array of subordinate patents that could 
compete with each once the original patent expires or that create a thicket of overlap-
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grantback, or by allowing the patentee to extend its monopoly to 
technology not within the scope of the original patent. 48 In the Anti-
trust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (the 
"Guidelines"), the Agencies state that grantbacks could reduce a li-
censee's incentive to engage in research and development when they 
know that they will not have an exclusive monopoly to the result of 
their work, but will instead have to share such results with the original 
patentee. 49 This may be especially true where improvements are as-
signed back to the original patentee, but may also occur in exclusive 
k 50 grantbac agreements. 
From an antitrust perspective, exclusive grantback clauses are 
suspect for another reason. Because exclusive grantbacks generally 
prohibit one or all parties to a licensing agreement from further licens-
ing the improvements to other third parties, such grantbacks could 
create a barrier to entry in the market. 51 Since the patentee holds the 
original patent and the licensee holds the improvement patent, a third 
party seeking access to such technology must go to both parties and 
negotiate separate licensing agreements with differing terms of use. 52 
48 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE CoMM'N, ANTl,TRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 30 (1995) [hereinifter Guidelines] (stat-
ing that grantback clauses may adversely affect competition). 
49 Id. 
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tion is "inchoate at the time the restraint occurs." A.REEDA, supra note 35, at if l 782f. 
But, the argument is certainly not without precedent in other contexts of licensing 
intellectual property. See Lasercomb America v. Reynolds, 911F.2d970, 979 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (finding that a copyright licensor's requirement that the licensee of its 
software not develop any competing software was an attempt to use its copyright to 
violate basic policy of intellectual property law-the development of the arts). 
si See AREEDA, supra note 35 (stating that third parties benefit from nonex-
clusive grantback clauses because they may license both the original--0r dominant-
patent and the improvement--0r subordinate-patent from any party to the original 
license agreement, reducing the cost to enter the market). 
52 See generally Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 406-07 
(1945) (finding that Hartford-Empire Co. acquired, by issue or assignment, more than 
600 patents in the glass-making industry, and restricted the use of its patented tech-
nology to outsiders by a network of agreements). See also AREEDA, supra note 35 
("To make the improved product ... one needs access to both patents .... While a 
third party could negotiate separately with the owners of each patent, transaction costs 
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This situation increases the cost of contracting, complicates the nego-
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not parallel one another in their scope of use, thus becoming unwork-
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their effect is to suppress or unduly restrict competition. And [patent] pooling ar-
rangements may obviously result in restricting competition."). 
s
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ss AREEDA, supra note 35. 
56 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (2002) 
("The claim defines the scope of the patent grant.") (citation omitted). 
s
7 See AREEDA, supra note 35 ("[S]uch cartel or monopolization scenarios 
hardly describe the typical grantback and therefore provide no ground for any cate-
gorical characterization as patent misuse or antitrust violation."). 
s
8 See id. ("[T]he monopoly may be extended in time or otherwise reinforced 
when grantbacks bring the dominant firm an array of subordinate patents that could 
compete with each once the original patent expires or that create a thicket of overlap-
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II. HISTORY OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF GRANTBACK 
CLAUSES BY THE COURTS AND THE AGENCIES 
The Supreme Court first solidly addressed. the permissibility of 
grantback clauses in patent license agreements in Transparent-Wrap 
Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. ("Transwrap"). 60 The Transpar-
ent-Wrap Machine Corporation ("Transwrap") held a series of patents 
on a machine that made, filled, and sealed cellophane packages for 
candy and other similar articles. 61 Stokes & Smith Company 
("Stokes") acquired Transwrap' s business and the right to use its 
trademarks, but only obtained licenses on-as opposed to ownership 
of-Transwrap's patents. Under the license agreement, Stokes was 
required to assign back to Transwrap any improvements it developed 
in the use of Transwrap' s patents. 62 Several years after the agreement 
was completed, Stokes took out several patents on improvements, but 
refused to assign them back to Transwrap. Transwrap sought to col-
lect the patents it had been denied, but when that was unsuccessful, 
Transwrap notified Stokes that the agreement was void and would be 
unwound. 63 Stokes brought a declaratory judgment action asking that 
the grantback provisions be declared illegal and unenforceable, and 
that Transwrap be enjoined from terminating the agreement. 64 
Judge Learned Hand for the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit held that Transwrap' s grantback provisions were 
per se illegal and unenforceable, analogizing the provisions to tying 
agreements. 65 Under the antitrust prohibition on tying arrangements, 
ping patent claims. New entrants may find such a thicket hard to penetrate, because 
fighting a weaker patent may be fruitless when many others remain in force."). 
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (generally proscribing any contract, combination 
or conspiracy that unreasonably restrains the nation's domestic: or foreign trade or 
commerce). 
60 329 U.S. 637 (1947). 
61 Id. at 638. 
62 Id. at 638-39. 
63 Id. at 639-40. 
64 Id. at 640. 
65 Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 156 F.2d 198, 202 
(2d Cir. 1946). The antitrust doctrine against tying arrangements prohibits a seller 
from conditioning the sale of its goods on the purchase, rental, or license of a separate 
and distinct good or service. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 
(1958) (defining a tying arrangement as "an agreement by a party to sell one product 
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or 
at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier."); Int'l 
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947) (prohibiting International Salt 
Company from conditioning the licensing of its patented salt processing machinery on 
the purchase and use of its unpatented salt because "patents confer no right to restrain 
use of, or trade in, unpatented salt ... [and] by contracting to close [the] market for 
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Judge Hand stated that the grantback provision in question gave the 
patentee control over unpatented articles-the improvement patents-
which but for the agreement, it would not possess. 66 Judge Hand re-
lied on a line of Supreme Court cases which established that tying 
arrangements using patents as the tying product disturbed public poli-
cy and patent laws by endowing the patentee with a monopoly beyond 
the scope of its original patent. 67 
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Second 
Circuit. 68 The Court rightly (in this author's opinion) repudiated Judge 
Hand's use of the per se rule, and stated that antitrust consideration of 
grant-back clauses in patent licensing agreements should be analyzed 
under the rule of reason. 69 In justifying this principle, the Court did 
not agree with Judge Hand that a patent grantback was like a tying 
arrangement that impermissibly grew the original patentee's monopo-
ly. Instead, the Court stated that it is merely "conceivabl[ e ]" that a 
patent grantback provision "could be employed with the purpose and 
effect of violating the anti-trust laws."70 The court stated that the in-
quiry, however, must be whether the provision substantially lessens 
competition or tends to create an impermissible monopoly. 71 Where 
salt against competition, International has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its 
patents afford no immunity from the anti-trust laws.") (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. 
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942)). 
66 Stokes & Smith Co, 156 F.2d at 203. 
67 Stokes & Smith Co. , 156 F.2d at 201 (relying on Bauer v. O'Connel, 229 
U.S. 1, Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, and Mercoid Corpo-
ration v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661). 
68 Transparent-Wrap, 329 U.S. at 648. Justices Black, Rutledge, Burton and 
Murphy would have ruled Transparent's grantback provisions illegal for the same 
reasons articulated by Judge Hand below. 
69 See id. ("We only hold that the inclusion in the license of the condition 
requiring the licensee to assign improvement patents is not per se illegal and unen-
forceable."). In so holding, the Court disagreed that the expansion of a patentee's 
legal monopoly by contract is violative of public policy, and stated that Congress 
made all patents assignable for unlimited consideration. Id. at 642. Furthermore, 
Judge Hand's analogy of grantback clauses as tying arrangements was weak, accord-
ing to the Court. While tying arrangements use patent rights to expand the monopoly 
power to non-patented products, grantback clauses involve ''using one legalized mo-
nopoly to acquire another legalized monopoly." Id. at 644. Thus, a grantback provi-
sion is not violative of public policy. See id. at 642-45 ("If Congress, by whose au-
thority patent rights are created, had allowed patents to be assigned only for a speci-
fied consideration, it would be our duty to permit no exceptions. But here Congress 
has made no such limitation. [The] exclusive right [created by the patent], ... is, for 
purposes of the assignment statute, of the same dignity as any other property which 
may be used to purchase patents."). 
70 Id. at 646. 
71 Id. at 647. (The "rule ofreason" is a general inquiry into whether, under 
"all the circumstances," the challenged conduct "impos[es] an unreasonable restraint 
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patents are used to suppress competition through restrictive licensing, 
a whole industry may be drawn under the control of one company. 72 
Its competitors would winnow out, and "an industrial monopoly 
[would be] perfected and maintained."73 Thus, the Court made the 
antitrust inquiry a matter of proof, which meant "that the challenger 
must show that the practice is reasonably calculated to create or pro-
long monopoly power."74 
Transwrap, therefore, stands for the proposition that antitrust re-
view of grantback provisions in patent license agreements should al-
ways be under the rule of reason. 75 While Transwrap was a step in the 
right direction, the Court missed its chance to push antitrust into a 
more effective direction, requiring the legality of grantback provisions 
to be assessed based on their particular upstream or downstream mar-
ket context. Instead, the court merely said that grantback provisions 
are not presumptively illegal, thus leaving their legality subject to an 
exhaustive and confusing battle under the rule of reason. 76 
Subsequent to Transwrap, federal courts have generally followed 
Justice Douglas' admonition to use the rule of reason instead of the 
per se rule to determine the anticompetitive effects of grantback pro-
visions. Furthermore, the Agencies adopted the Transwrap standard in 
the Guidelines. Section 5.6 of the Guidelines addresses grantback 
clauses. Similar to the Court in Transwrap, it states that grantback 
provisions can have procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and 
should be analyzed through the weighing of such effects, paying care-
on competition."). See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 
(1977) ("[T]he factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding wheth-
er a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on 
competition."). · 
72 See, e.g., Kobe v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 420 (10th Cir. 1952) 
(prohibiting attempted monopolization of the hydraulic oil pump industry through the 
use of exclusive grantback clauses in patent license agreements); United States~­
Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 311 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (finding exclusive grant-: 
backs of"inventions still unborn" a prominent tool in illegal horizontal combination). 
73 Transparent-Wrap, 329 U.S. at 646-47. 
74 AREEDA, supra note 35 at 520. 
75 On remand, the Second Circuit, applying the rule of reason, found that 
Transwrap's "double monopoly'' did not violate the antitrust laws because the market 
extension was not equivalent to an unreasonable restraint of trade. Stokes & Smith 
Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 161F.2d565, 567 (2d Cir. 1947). 
76 Thomas A. Piraino, Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approach-
es to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 685, 690 (1991) [hereinafter Reconciling] 
("The Court's rule of reason formula requires a weighing of all the circumstances of 
each case to determine whether a restraint is legal. This checklist approach puts so 
many factors at issue that none is dispositive. The only certainty under the rule of 
reason is that courts will be required to engage in a complicated and prolonged inves-
tigation into market impact before deciding on the legality of a particular restraint.'.'). 
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ful attention to any possible reduction of the licensee's incentive to 
. t 77 lllllOVa e. 
However, the Transwrap doctrine is hardly uncontroversial, and 
while the current iteration of the Guidelines follow its principles, his-
tory has indicated unease with the Transwrap decision. In 1964, the 
Supreme Court enunciated a ruling that ran directly counter to the 
reasoning of the Transwrap decision. In Brulotte v. Thys Co., 78 the 
owner of various "hop-picking" patents, the Thys Company, sold ma-
chines with corresponding patent license agreements to Brulotte. 79 
Under the agreements, Thys Company required Brulotte to pay it roy-
alties for use of the patented machines. Both the agreement and the 
required royalties extended beyond the date of Thys Company's pa-
tents. 80 
Justice Douglas-the same Justice who wrote the majority opin-
ion in Transwrap-held that any attempt by the patentee to continue 
its patent monopoly beyond the expiration of the patent is per se un-
lawful. 81 Justice Douglas analogized Thys Company's royalty agree-
ment to a tying arrangement, a la Judge Learned Hand, and stated, 
"[a] patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can 
negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage 
to project those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is anal-
ogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tying the 
sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented 
ones."82 Several commentators have suggested that this ruling under-
mines the force of Transwrap. 83 
This Note disagrees. Instead, the Brulotte holding comes closer to 
capturing the opportunity missed in Transwrap of tailoring the legali-
ty of grantback provisions to their particular upstream and down-
stream context. While the facial holding of Brulotte seems to contra-
dict Transwrap-by stating that a patentee's attempt to extend its mo-
77 Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30 ("Such arrangements provide a means for 
the licensee and the licensor to share risks and reward the licensor for making possi-
ble further innovation based on or informed by the licensed technology .... [But,] 
may adversely affect competition ... if they substantially reduce the licensee's incen-
tives to engage in research and development and thereby limit rivalry in innovation 
markets."). 
78 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
79 Id. at 29. 
80 Id. at 30. 
81 Id. 31-32. 
82 Id. at 33. 
83 E.g. WARDS. BOWMAN, PATENT & ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMICAPPRAISAL232 (1973); Paul G. Chevigny, The Validity of Grant-Back 
Agreements Under the Antitntst Laws, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 570 (1966); 
Schmalbeck, supra note 35, at 741. 
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83 E.g. WARDS. BOWMAN, PATENT&ANTITRUSTLAW: A LEGAL AND 
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nopoly through restrictive licensing clauses is per se illegal-the 
holding can also be seen as a narrow evolution on the Transwrap de-
cision: where the license agreement exists in a downstream arrange-
ment, attempts to monopolize, fix prices, or reduce output through the 
licensing agreement are per se illegal. Brulotte licensed Thys' tech-
nology to "produce" and sell hops, a prototypical downstream activi-
ty. 84 Because Thys sought to advance its royalties on patented tech-
nology beyond the patent, it was artificially extending its monopoly 
and inflating the price of its technology above what it would go for in 
a competitive market without patent protection. Such monopolization 
and price inflation by agreement are central prohibitions of Sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act. 85 Thus, because Thys used a licensing re-
striction, analogous to a grantback, clause to artificially extend its 
monopoly and fix the price of its technology in a downstream ar-
rangement, the per se rule is justified. 86 Thus Brulotte should stand 
more clearly for the notion that grantback clauses, and other license 
restrictions, may be especially abusive to the marketplace in down-
stream arrangements, and should therefore be viewed much more 
skeptically in that context. 
The DOJ voiced further dissatisfaction with the Transwrap deci-
sion in the 1960's when it announced that it would seek to upend 
Transwrap and establish that "assignment-backs" and "exclusive li-
cense-backs" be treated as per se antitrust violations. 87 The DOJ justi-
fied this announcement with the "simple reason that [the rule of rea-
son] is much more restrictive than necessary to protect the patentee's 
84 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 29. 
85 Sherman Act§ 1 prohibits any "contract ... in restraint of trade or com-
merce," such as an agreement to inflate prices above the level that would exist under 
healthy competition, and Sherman Act § 2 criminalizes "[ e ]very person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person 
or persons, to monopolize any part of ... trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 
(2006). 
86 As argued below, attempts to monopolize, fix prices, or reduce output in 
upstream arrangements are likely much less successful and harmful, and thus do not 
warrant per se treatment. 
87 See Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 29 AB.A. ANTITRUST 
SECTION 187, 188 (1965) ("[W]e shall ... seek to establish, contrary to Trans-Wrap, 
that a clause in a patent license requiring the licensee to grant back to the patentee all 
future improvement patents should be held unlawful per se for the simple reason that 
it is much more restrictive than necessary to protect the patentee's legitimate inter-
ests."). In a question-and-answer session after Turner-the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in Charge of the Antitrust Division-presented his paper, he was asked what kind 
of grantback clauses the DOJ thought should be per se unlawful. Mr. Turner respond-
ed that only assignment-back and exclusive license-back agreements should be per se 
unlawful, and not non-exclusive license-backs. Id. at 192. 
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legitimate interests."88 Since that declaration, however, the Agencies 
have resolved that grantback clauses should be treated under the rule 
of reason, regardless of whether the clauses assign back or exclusively 
license back improvement patents, and regardless of whether the 
grantback exists in an upstream or downstream context. 89 
But simply resorting to the rule of reason is a mistake. As men-
tioned, the rule of reason can be incredibly burdensome and inexact. 
Instead of applying a blanket rule of reason, or even a per se presump-
tion, the courts and the Agencies should follow what Justice Douglas 
attempted to do in Brulotte: tailor a sliding-scale analysis to grantback 
clauses based on the particular upstream or downstream context in 
which the provision exists. The particular problems of a blanket appli-
cation of the per se rule or rule of reason are discussed in the follow-
ing section. 
III. WHY Do WE EVEN NEED A PER SE AND RULE OF 
REASON DICHOTOMY FOR PATENT GRANTBACKS? 
In antitrust law, it is regularly argued that determining which rule 
to apply in a case-the per se rule or the rule of reason-often settles 
the outcome before analysis begins. 90 All conduct that elicits per se 
treatment is quite obviously illegal under the antitrust laws, and thus 
88 Id. See also Eileen Shanahan, Patent Licensing Will Be US. Antitrust 
Target: Justice Aid Sees Civil Actions as a Spur to Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
1965, at 31 (stating that Donald F. Turner, the head of the Justice Department's Anti-
trust Division, was interested in testing "the legality of ... 'grant-back' provisions of 
patent licenses" and that Mr. Turner believed that courts "could hold the very exist-
ence of such an agreement is illegal, without requiring the Government to prove that 
any harm has been done to competition."); M'Laren Ready for Patent Suit-Tells Bar 
Association that Grant-Back's Will Be Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1969, at 67 
("[Assistant Attorney General Richard W.] McLaren told a meeting of the antitrust 
section of the American Bar Association that [grantback] agreements 'tend unduly to 
extend the patent monopoly and to stifle research and development efforts of licen-
sees."). 
89 See Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From 
Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 11 (2000) ("Today, the federal antitrust 
authorities have a more refined view of the likely effect of grantbacks on innovation, 
competition, and consumer welfare. Grantback provisions are now evaluated under a 
more detailed rule of reason inquiry, in which we examine the likely effects of the 
grantback in light of the overall structure of the licensing arrangement and conditions 
in the relevant markets.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Transparent-
Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 645-48 (1947)). 
90 See Reconciling, supra note 76, at 685 ("The rule ofreason and per se 
approaches have been so divergent that a court's choice of one analysis over the other 
will usually determine the outcome of an antitrust case."). 
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every suit in which the per se rule applies is a win for the plaintiff. 91 
Conversely, all conduct that warrants rule of reason treatment either 
tends to be tolerable, or litigation becomes so extensive and the plain-
tiffs burden so heavy92 that settlement in favor of the defendant be-
comes likely. 93 In fact, since the Transwrap rule of reason principle 
was articulated, the DOJ has never prevailed in a · case involving 
grantback provisions alone. 94 
Furthermore, since the time Transwrap and its progeny were de-
cided, some federal courts have become discontented with the dichot-
omy between the per se rule and the rule of reason approach to anti-
trust matters at large. 95 The per se rule-whether used in a grantback 
clause case or otherwise-often gives short shrift to the economic 
effects of the challenged conduct. "By mechanically precluding cer-
tain conduct without any consideration of its economic effects, the 
rule deter[ s] beneficial, as well as pernicious, business practices. "96 
On the other hand, a rule of reason analysis can often be unwieldy 
because of the extensive competitive inquiry "that exhaust[ s] the par-
ties' resources, the courts' time, and the ability of jurors to render 
effective decisions."97 The rule ofreason also fails to give any guid-
ance to businesses trying to conduct themselves lawfully. 98 
91 Id. ("Traditionally, the rule of reason has meant a decision for the defend-
ant and the per se rule a victory for the plaintiff."). 
92 The rule of reason often requires that the plaintiff provide in depth eco-
nomic analysis of the anticompetitive market impact of defendant's conduct, and 
reasons why defendant's justifications do not overbalance its anticompetitive effect, 
using a multitude of factors, none of which are dispositive. See Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Vertical Arrangements and the Rule a/Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 153, 155 
(1984) ("A global inquiry invites no answer, it puts too many things in issue .... Of 
course judges cannot do what such open-ended formulas require. When everything is 
relevant, nothing is dispositive."); M. Laurence Popofsky & David B. Goodwin, The 
"Hard-Boiled" Rule a/Reason Revisited, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 198 (1987) (de-
scribing the application of the rule ofreason as "a long list of factors without any 
indication of priority or weight to be accorded to each factor.") (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
93 See Reconciling, supra note 76, at 685 ("Traditionally, the rule ofreason 
has meant a decision for the defendant and the per se rule a victory for the plaintiff."). 
94 Schmalbeck, supra note 35, at 739. As Richard Schmalbeck points out, 
this is due in part because so few cases deal with grantback provisions alone, but 
instead "[t]he profusion of issues in these cases has obscured the grant-back issue, 
that question often being treated briefly and rather mechanically." Id. (citing United 
States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 815-16 (D.N.J. 1949)). See also 
AREEDA, supra note 35 at 519 ("Apart from the rare attempt to monopolize, nonex-
clusive grantbacks are virtually always upheld."). 
95 Collaborations , supra note 16, at 1144. 
96 Id. at 1145. 
97 Id. at 1144. 
98 Reconciling, supra note 76, at 690. 
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A. Inaccuracy of the Per Se Rule and the Rule of 
Reason 
The dichotomy between the per se rule and the rule of reason is 
not helpful in the context of grantback clauses in patent license 
agreements for two reasons. First, the dichotomy often muddles and 
confuses the bottom line of the antitrust inquiry. In general, grantback 
clauses are unlike other conduct challenged as "contract[ s ], combina-
tion ... or conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade,"99 such as price-fixing, 
territorial restraints, or restraints on product out-put. While price-
fixing agreements, territorial restraints and restrictions on product 
output raise clear anticompetitive concerns, 100 grantback clauses often 
have less obvious anticompetitive effects. Grantback clauses can cata-
lyze procompetitive conduct by incentivizing the dissemination of 
technology, and encourage innovation by allowing the original patent-
ee to "share in the value of ... future innovations to which it has con-
tributed by providing access to its invention." 101 Price fixing and other 
per se illegal anticompetitive conduct does not carry such adjuvant 
qualities. 
On the other hand, grantback clauses are also unlike prototypical 
rule of reason contracts, such as mergers, vertical agreements, or tying 
arrangements. Patent license agreements, as stated above, can be 
viewed as a form of joint venture in that the parties partially integrate 
through the licensing and use of the patented technology to accom-
plish some new concern. Where such a joint venture does not remove 
competition from the marketplace, or does not result in cartelization 
or monopolization (as in Brulotte v. Thys Co.), anticompetitive effects 
are much less obvious. 102 Mergers, on the other hand, are transactions 
resulting in full integration of two companies who are frequently 
competitors. A merger may often lead to serious anticompetitive ef-
fects if it significantly increases market concentration, opens the door 
to coordinated interaction (i.e. oligopolistic behavior) in the relevant 
99 Sherman Antitrust Act §1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
100 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (holding 
that an agreement on the part of the members of a combination controlling a substan-
tial part of an industry which fixes the prices which the members are to charge for 
their commodity is in itself an undue and unreasonable restraint of trade); see also 
United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (holding that allocation of territories to 
cooperative buying association members in which they had exclusive or de facto 
exclusive licenses to sell the association's private-label brands, together with a veto-
like power over admission of new members, constituted a horizontal restraint and a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act). 
101 AREEDA, supra note 35, at ifl 782. 
102 Id. 
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102 Id. 
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market, or creates entry barriers for new competitors. 103 Vertical 
agreements may raise similarly significant anticompetitive effects, 
such as boycotting competitors. 104 Thus, grantbacks in patent license 
agreements can generally be distinguished from other rule of reason 
conduct because their anticompetitive effects are much less serious. In 
fact, the Agencies have stated that their main concern with grantback 
clauses is the possibility that they will "substantially reduce the licen-
see's incentive to engage in research and development and thereby 
limit rivalry in innovation markets." 105 
Courts and the Agencies complicate the issues by using the same 
antitrust tests on grantback clauses as those used on price fixing and 
horizontal mergers. As the Supreme Court said in California Dental 
Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 106 "it does not follow that 
every case attacking a less obviously anticompetitive restraint ... is a 
candidate for plenary market examination."107 Instead, the requisite 
inquiry is "whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competi-
tion." 108 The Supreme Court recognized that often the "quality of 
proofrequired should vary with the circumstances."109 As argued be-
low in Part IV, a more tailored approach to grantback clauses that 
focuses solely on the upstream or downstream context in which the 
grantback clause exists would serve the antitrust bottom line more 
efficiently. 
B. Special Context of Grantback Clauses in High 
Technology Markets 
The second reason why the per se and rule of reason dichotomy is 
unhelpful in analyzing grantback clauses is that patent license agree-
ments today exist significantly in high technology markets. 110 High 
103 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE CoMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (1997) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines] (describing the various anticom-
petitive effects a merger can have and thus the need for a full rule of reason analysis 
in determining legality) available at 
http ://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ guidelines/hmg.pd£ 
104 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs complaint stated a cause of action under the Sherman Act by alleg-
ing that a combination consisting of many manufacturers, distributors, and a compet-
ing retailer conspired among themselves either not to sell to plaintiff, or to sell to it 
only at discriminatory prices and highly unfavorable terms). 
105 Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30. 
106 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
107 Id. at 779. 
108 Id. at 780. 
109 Id. 
11° Choi, supra note 33, at 803. 
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technology and innovation markets have unusual economic features 
that make the traditional, unvarying antitrust analysis more difficult 
(or even illogical) to apply. 111 This is especially true where intellectu-
al property is the driving force in the market. In fact, Robert Pitofsky, 
former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and now Joseph 
and Madeline Sheehy Professor of Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
Law at Georgetown Law Center, emphasized this point: "High tech, 
or more specifically intellectual property markets, are different. The 
kind of static analysis that we often have applied in the past . . . is in 
fact unlikely to be fully adequate to take high tech into account." 112 
Generally, there are two reasons for this difference. First, markets 
that are driven by innovation and technology move more rapidly than 
other markets. 113 Second, high technology markets "tend to coalesce 
around single products that create the standard for an entire indus-
try." 114 "Because of the advantages that will accrue to the 'first mov-
er' to be successful in the network market, there is likely to be fierce 
competition among firms for the ultimate winner-take-all position." 115 
In many respects, this type of "tipping" 116 can be good for con-
sumers. 117 For example, Microsoft's dominant market position in per-
sonal computer operating systems has standardized personal compu-
ting such that consumers can rely on the same basic platform in every 
personal computer they use, making their work more efficient and 
dependable. High technology firms may also be more willing to enter 
new markets, or even create new markets, if they see an opportunity to 
111 High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 74. See also Seth Schiesel, 
New Economy: Bringing Competition Policy Into the Age of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 25, 2000, at Cl ("Many of the analytical and intellectual tools that competition 
authorities use these days were developed for slow-changing industries like manufac-
turing. But these methods may not be up to the task of dealing equitably with technol-
ogy sectors where the competitive landscape can change significantly from year to 
year."). 
112 Schiesel, supra note 111, at C3. 
113 See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 74 ("High technology 
markets are defined by their rapid pace of innovation. Technological breakthroughs 
can alter markets almost overnight."). 
114 Id. at75-76. 
115 Id. at 76. 
116 See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Mi-
crosoft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SUP. CT. ECON.REV. 157, 169 
(describing the "winner-take-all" effect that exists in network markets as a "'tipping' 
of the market to a single producer, or a single standard or kind of product."). 
117 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging 
by Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 16 (1998) ("Consumers, in fact, often 
benefit when single [technology] networks come to dominate secondary markets. Not 
only can a single network enforce common standards more effectively; it can also 
reduce consumers' costs of using the network."). 
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dependable. High technology firms may also be more willing to enter 
new markets, or even create new markets, if they see an opportunity to 
111 High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 74. See also Seth Schiesel, 
New Economy: Bringing Competition Policy Into the Age of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 25, 2000, at Cl ("Many of the analytical and intellectual tools that competition 
authorities use these days were developed for slow-changing industries like manufac-
turing. But these methods may not be up to the task of dealing equitably with technol-
ogy sectors where the competitive landscape can change significantly from year to 
year."). 
112 Schiesel, supra note 111, at C3. 
113 See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 74 ("High technology 
markets are defined by their rapid pace of innovation. Technological breakthroughs 
can alter markets almost overnight."). 
114 Id. at 75-76. 
115 Id. at 76. 
116 See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Mi-
crosoft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 157, 169 
(describing the "winner-take-all" effect that exists in network markets as a "'tipping' 
of the market to a single producer, or a single standard or kind of product."). 
117 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging 
by Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998) ("Consumers, in fact, often 
benefit when single [technology] networks come to dominate secondary markets. Not 
only can a single network enforce common standards more effectively; it can also 
reduce consumers' costs of using the network."). 
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dominate that new market. 118 Entering or creating new markets is 
good for consumers because it increases available products and ser-
vices. It also encourages innovation, which is the underlying principle 
of patent protection and antitrust's greatest hope in competitive high 
technology markets. 
Because technology markets evolve more rapidly than other mar-
kets, and because a certain level of monopolization in high technology 
can benefit consumers more than in other markets, courts and the anti-
trust regulatory agencies should evaluate high technology contracts or 
conspiracies "in restraint of trade" 119 from a different perspective. As 
Thomas Piraino correctly points out, overenforcement might discour-
age firms from significant innovation, while underenforcement might 
induce a firm shift from efficient monopolization to counduct that 
would injure consumers, such as erecting burdensome entry barriers 
for competitors, raising prices, or reducing output. 120 
In the context of grantback clauses in patent license agreements, 
the extensive rule of reason inquiry is even less necessary. Because 
grantback provisions are rarely challenged on their own, but are chal-
lenged along with other types of anticompetitive conduct, applying an 
extensive rule of reason analysis to the effects of such clauses is un-
necessary and a waste of judicial resources. 
Instead, courts and the Agencies should assess the legality of 
grantback provisions by focusing on the context of the license agree-
ment and grantback provision. Courts and the Agencies should ask 
whether the license agreement contemplates an upstream joint venture 
(such as through research and development, where the aim is to de-
velop new products or technology) or is for a downstream joint ven-
ture (such as a production joint venture, which is closer to the market 
and has a greater potential to displace competition and injure consum-
ers). Inquiring into whether the grantback clause exists in an upstream 
joint venture or downstream joint venture will do much of the heavy 
lifting in determining whether the provision has potential anticompeti-
tive effects. 
IV. A MORE NUANCED CONTEXTUAL INQUIRY 
A patent licensing agreement is similar to a joint venture. In either 
scheme, two or more firms collaborate through licensing agreements 
to achieve a specific business objective beneficial to all involved 
118 High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 83. 
119 15 U.S.C. §1 (2006) (Sherman Act§ 1). 
120 High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 76-77. 
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firms. 121 Joint ventures can be subdivided for antitrust purposes into 
upstreamjoint ventures and downstreamjoint ventures. 122 
Upstream joint ventures are those collaborations that focus on 
production "inputs" and are furthest from the marketplace. 123 Exam-
ples of upstream joint ventures include research and development, 
industry standard setting, and joint buying. 124 Within these types of 
upstream joint ventures, patent license agreements are most prevalent 
in research and development joint ventures. 
Downstream joint ventures, on the other hand, focus on produc-
tion "outputs."125 Examples of downstream joint ventures include 
production joint ventures, marketing joint ventures, and at times, in-
dustry standard setting joint ventures. Downstream joint ventures are 
closer to the market and the consumer, and thus may be more prone to 
anticompetitive conduct, such as removing competition between pre-
viously competing firms in the market in which they were already 
competing. 126 Within the downstream category of joint ventures, pa-
tent license agreements are most likely to exist in production joint 
ventures. 
There is a difference in analysis between license agreements for 
the purpose of research and development, and license agreements for 
the purpose of production. The former potentially creates products not 
previously available in the market place, whereas the latter may simp-
ly be an allowance to produce what others, including the original pa-
121 See ABAANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 372 
(Willard K. Tom et al. eds, 3d ed. 1992) (defining ''joint venture"); DEP'T OF JUSTICE 
& FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG 
COMPETITORS 2 (2002) [hereinafter Collaboration Guidelines] (stating that a "'com-
petitor collaboration' comprises a set of one or more agreements, other than merger 
agreements, between or among competitors to engage in economic activity, and the 
economic activity resulting therefrom."). 
122 Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1177, 1182. 
123 Id. at 1178 ("[U]pstreamjoint ventures limited to research and develop-
ment ... or other 'inputs' into the productive process do not affect the parties' deci-
sions on pricing and output."). See also Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the 
Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV. 
1007, 1040 (1969) (implying that such joint ventures are not competitive); Walter T. 
Winslow, Joint Ventures-Antitrust Problems and Opportunities, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 
979, 983-84 (1985) (noting that research and development joint ventures avoid many 
anticompetitive pitfalls). 
124 Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1178. 
125 Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1178. 
126 See Polle Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.1985) (holding 
that a joint venture was lawful where two companies in the home building industry 
agreed to form a joint venture which owned and operated a retail store selling each 
company's respective wares because the cooperation improved economies of scale, 
lowered costs, and did not restrict output in the marketplace). 
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120 High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 7 6-77. 
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firms. 121 Joint ventures can be subdivided for antitrust purposes into 
upstreamjoint ventures and downstreamjoint ventures. 122 
Upstream joint ventures are those collaborations that focus on 
production "inputs" and are furthest from the marketplace. 123 Exam-
ples of upstream joint ventures include research and development, 
industry standard setting, and joint buying. 124 Within these types of 
upstream joint ventures, patent license agreements are most prevalent 
in research and development joint ventures. 
Downstream joint ventures, on the other hand, focus on produc-
tion "outputs."125 Examples of downstream joint ventures include 
production joint ventures, marketing joint ventures, and at times, in-
dustry standard setting joint ventures. Downstream joint ventures are 
closer to the market and the consumer, and thus may be more prone to 
anticompetitive conduct, such as removing competition between pre-
viously competing firms in the market in which they were already 
competing. 126 Within the downstream category of joint ventures, pa-
tent license agreements are most likely to exist in production joint 
ventures. 
There is a difference in analysis between license agreements for 
the purpose of research and development, and license agreements for 
the purpose of production. The former potentially creates products not 
previously available in the market place, whereas the latter may simp-
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121 See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LA w DEVELOPMENTS 3 72 
(Willard K. Tom et al. eds, 3d ed. 1992) (defining "joint venture"); DEP'T OF JUSTICE 
& FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG 
COMPETITORS 2 (2002) [hereinafter Collaboration Guidelines] (stating that a "'com-
petitor collaboration' comprises a set of one or more agreements, other than merger 
agreements, between or among competitors to engage in economic activity, and the 
economic activity resulting therefrom."). 
122 Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1177, 1182. 
123 Id. at 1178 ("[U]pstreamjoint ventures limited to research and develop-
ment ... or other 'inputs' into the productive process do not affect the parties' deci-
sions on pricing and output."). See also Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the 
Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV. 
1007, 1040 (1969) (implying that such joint ventures are not competitive); Walter T. 
Winslow, Joint Ventures-Antitrust Problems and Opportunities, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 
979, 983-84 (1985) (noting that research and development joint ventures avoid many 
anticompetitive pitfalls). 
124 Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1178. 
125 Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1178. 
126 See Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.1985) (holding 
that a joint venture was lawful where two companies in the home building industry 
agreed to form a joint venture which owned and operated a retail store selling each 
company's respective wares because the cooperation improved economies of scale, 
lowered costs, and did not restrict output in the marketplace). 
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tentee, are already producing. This latter type of arrangement might 
exist where the patentee is located in one region, say the Northeast, 
but wants to expand to another region, say the Southwest, yet lacks 
the necessary resources. The patentee can merely license its patented 
product to a firm in the Southwest instead of opening up its own pro-
duction facilities. This section discusses how courts should evaluate 
grantback clauses that exist in the context of upstream and down-
streamjoint ventures. 
A. Grantback Clauses in Upstream Joint Ventures 
Grantback clauses in upstream ventures, such as research and de-
velopment joint ventures should be presumptively legal, unless the 
grantback · is exclusive or the original patentee has a monopolistic 
market share. 127 Grantback clauses in upstream collaborations gener-
ally do not affect the licensee's incentives to engage in research and 
development, 128 but instead further incentivize research and develop-
ment. In other words, but for the grantback clause, the patentee may 
not license its technology to others out of fear of being replaced in the 
market. Where the patentee can be certain that it will not be replaced 
or superseded by improvements created by the joint venture, it is more 
likely to license its technology. 
Moreover, grantback clauses may be viewed as ancillary restraints 
to legitimate upstream joint ventures where they are not exclusive and 
overbroad. 129 First, as a normative principal, the law should encourage 
research and development joint ventures because of their efficiencies. 
127 The Agencies already use exclusivity and market power in their rule of 
reason analysis of grantback clauses, but this Note proposes that a more nuanced 
contextual analysis needs to accompany an exclusivity and market power inquiry. See 
Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30 (stating that the Agencies will evaluate whether a 
grantback clause will eliminate or reduce a licensee's incentive to innovate through its 
exclusivity, and whether the licensor has market power in a relevant technology or 
innovation market). 
128 See Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30 (holding that the reduction in the 
licensee's incentive to engage in research and development, and thereby limit rivalry 
in innovation markets, is the key focus of antitrust inquiry into grantback clauses). 
129 The doctrine of ancillary restraints was created by Judge Taft when he sat 
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Ad-
dyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). Judge Taft stated, "no convention-
. al restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancil-
lary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee 
in the full enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the 
dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party." Id. at 282. In other words, 
where a restraint on trade is necessary for legitimate and procompetitive business 
practices, it will not be struck down as illegal. 
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Grantback clauses can be viewed as necessary aids for research and 
development joint ventures because of their ability to protect the pa-
tentee's interests. 130 As stated above, without the grantback provision, 
protecting the patentee's position in the relevant innovation market, 
the patentee may be reluctant to enter the joint venture and may look 
for alternative avenues for furthering its technology development. 
Also, in high technology markets, research and development joint 
ventures may be the only tool small techllology firms can use to gain 
market power against more dominant firms that have "tipped" the 
market. 131 Because a small firm with proprietary technology may be 
quickly eliminated from the market if its patented technology is super-
seded-and it has no rights to that superseding technology-a grant-
back clause may be a proper method of protecting such small joint 
venturers, allowing them to compete with more dominant firms. 
Finally, upstream joint ventures generally do not affect the pricing 
our output of current products, and thus can have no adverse effect on 
the relevant innovation market. 132 Federal courts have long held that a 
limitation on output is the key concern in any analysis of contracts or 
agreements allegedly in restraint of trade. 133 Upstream joint ventures 
generally do not affect output since their focus is not on putting prod-
ucts into the market, but instead is on developing technology that 
could be turned into a marketable product, setting standards for an 
industry, or purchasing raw materials to be used in production. Use of 
a grantback clause by a patent holder in an upstream joint venture 
would not shift the joint venture's effect on output from negligible to 
consequential. A grantback clause merely requires that the original 
patentee have some rights to any improvements developed as a result 
of the joint venture. 
Thus, grantback clauses in upstream joint ventures should be pre-
sumptively legal because they do not restrict others' incentives to in-
novate, but rather promote industry innovation and dissemination. 
13° Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1182. Often research and development 
joint ventures are entered into because participants "lack the resources to finance a 
research and development project independently." Id. Where this is the case, dissemi-
nation of technology is facilitated only through the joint venture, since the patentee 
cannot develop its technology on its own, and the other parties don't have the patent-
ed technology. 
131 See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 142 ("Such ventures 
often allow smaller firms to participate in research projects in which they lack the 
wherewithal to pursue independently."). 
132 See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 137. 
133 See Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 
1996) ("The core question in antitrust is output. Unless a contract reduces output in 
some market, to the detriment of consumers, there is no antitrust problem."). 
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ed technology. 
131 See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 142 ("Such ventures 
often allow smaller firms to participate in research projects in which they lack the 
wherewithal to pursue independently."). 
132 See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 13 7. 
133 See Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 
1996) ("The core question in antitrust is output. Unless a contract reduces output in 
some market, to the detriment of consumers, there is no antitrust problem."). 
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They aid and protect smaller firms in high technology markets in 
competing against more dominant firms by encouraging joint ven-
tures. And, they do not limit the output of products entering markets. 
Such grantback clauses are ancillary restraints reasonably necessary to 
accomplish the efficiencies of the joint venture. 134 
A court should only enjoin a grantback clause in an upstream joint 
venture if the grantback clause is exclusive 135 and prohibits the licen-
see from benefiting from improvements. Such a grantback clause may 
be a move toward monopolization. Where a grantback clause removes 
alienability rights of improvements from the licensee, and funnels any 
improvements back under the complete control of the patentee, the 
patentee should not be shielded from liability under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act simply because they entered into a legitimate joint ven-
ture.136 Attempts to establish a monopoly position in technology mar-
kets through the use of grantback clauses and patent pooling have 
been held illegal under the Sherman Act on several occasions. 137 
Therefore, where an exclusive grantback clause is used in an upstream 
joint venture, the legality of the upstream joint venture should not 
shield the monopolistic grantback. 
134 See Collaborations, supra note 16, at 1188 ("A court should simply con-
sider whether such restraints are necessary to promote the venture's precompetitive 
purposes."). -
135 See Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30 ("Compared with an exclusive grant-
back, a non-exclusive grantback, which leaves the licensee free to license improve-
ments technology to others, is less likely to have anticompetitive effects."). 
136 See High Technology Competition, supra note 2, at 138 (stating that a 
monopolistic behavior by the parties to a joint venture should not be shielded by the 
presumptive legality of the joint venture itself). See also Kobe, Inc. v. Kempsey Pump 
Co., 198 F.2d 416 (1952) (attempted monopolization to acquire via exclusive grant-
backs in patent license agreements). 
137 See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 327 (1947) 
("These patents, through the agreements in which they are enmeshed and the manner 
in which they have been used, have, in fact, been forged into instruments of domina-
tion of an entire industry."); Kobe, Inc., 198 F .2d at 423 ("We think the evidence 
warrants the finding that the first ... agreement ... was the beginning of an arrange-
ment to comer the hydraulic pump business for oil wells and that it had that result ... 
. Nor do we believe, under the circumstances of this case, that the new organization 
can escape the consequences of these arrangements."). 
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B. Grantback Clauses in Downstream Joint 
Ventures 
In the context of downstream joint ventures, grantback clauses are 
likely to exist most prevalently in production joint ventures. 138 Pro-
duction joint ventures are collaborations to produce some good or 
product. They are downstream because they are closer to the market 
and the customer. 139 A production joint venture can easily regulate 
output, as seen in Brulotte v. Thys, and thus has a higher propensity 
for being anticompetitive than upstream joint ventures. 140 Because 
production joint ventures are frequently the last stop on a product's 
journey to the retail shelf, a production joint venture may set prices 
for that good above competitive levels or reduce its yield. 141 This type 
of behavior is more likely to occur where the producing firm or firms 
have monopolistic power in the market. 142 
Grantback clauses used in production joint ventures can catalyze 
or stimulate monopolistic power and subsequent anticompetitive con-
sequences by limiting independent decision making or centralizing the 
control of a key asset-the licensed patent and any future improve-
ments. 143 Therefore, courts and the Agencies should analyze grant-
back clauses in production joint ventures with greater scrutiny than 
similar clauses in upstream joint ventures. 
Courts and the Agencies should treat grantback clauses in produc-
tion joint ventures more cautiously than in upstream joint ventures 
because they have the potential of furthering monopolistic or cartelis-
tic behavior in a downstream product. For example, Company A and 
138 See, e.g. Nat'! Lead Co., 332 U.S. at 327 (National Lead Co. used its pa-
tents in titanium pigments to control and regulate the manufacture and sale of titani-
um pigments and compounds in the United States) (emphasis added). 
139 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (de-
scribing an electric power company's attempt to control the "downstream" retail 
market of power supply by refusing to supply power to municipalities that did not 
renew the power company's retail franchise contract). 
140 Id. 
141 See Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 121, at 6 ("Competitor collabo-
rations may harm competition and consumers by increasing the ability or incentive 
profitably to raise price above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below 
what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement."). 
142 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 543, 547 
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that under 15 U.S.C. § 2 (the Sherman Act), a corporation's 
unilateral conduct to control an essential facility is not prohibited unless the corpora-
tion has the power to eliminate competition in the downstream market and the corpo-
ration exercises that power, thus monopolizing the market). 
143 See Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 121, at 6 (stating that the poten-
tial anticompetitive harms of joint ventures may be accomplished by agreements that 
"limit independent decision making or combine the control of ... key assets"). 
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135 See Guidelines, supra note 48, at 30 ("Compared with an exclusive grant-
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Co., 198 F.2d 416 (1952) (attempted monopolization to acquire via exclusive grant-
backs in patent license agreements). 
137 See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 327 (1947) 
("These patents, through the agreements in which they are enmeshed and the manner 
in which they have been used, have, in fact, been forged into instruments of domina-
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ment to comer the hydraulic pump business for oil wells and that it had that result ... 
. Nor do we believe, under the circumstances of this case, that the new organization 
can escape the consequences of these arrangements."). 
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B. Grantback Clauses in Downstream Joint 
Ventures 
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Courts and the Agencies should treat grantback clauses in produc-
tion joint ventures more cautiously than in upstream joint ventures 
because they have the potential of furthering monopolistic or cartelis-
tic behavior in a downstream product. For example, Company A and 
138 See, e.g. Nat'! Lead Co., 332 U.S. at 327 (National Lead Co. used its pa-
tents in titanium pigments to control and regulate the manufacture and sale of titani-
um pigments and compounds in the United States) (emphasis added). 
139 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (de-
scribing an electric power company's attempt to control the "downstream" retail 
market of power supply by refusing to supply power to municipalities that did not 
renew the power company's retail :franchise contract). 
140 Id. 
141 See Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 121, at 6 ("Competitor collabo-
rations may harm competition and consumers by increasing the ability or incentive 
profitably to raise price above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below 
what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement."). 
142 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 543, 547 
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that under 15 U.S.C. § 2 (the Sherman Act), a corporation's 
unilateral conduct to control an essential facility is not prohibited unless the corpora-
tion has the power to eliminate competition in the downstream market and the corpo-
ration exercises that power, thus monopolizing the market). 
143 See Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 121, at 6 (stating that the poten-
tial anticompetitive harms of joint ventures may be accomplished by agreements that 
"limit independent decision making or combine the control of ... key assets"). 
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Company B can form a production joint venture where Company A 
holds a key patent for a new type of widget that helps automobiles 
operate with less fuel, and Company B has the facilities and capital to 
produce and ship these widgets to car manufacturers. If the joint ven-
ture agreement contemplates that any and all improvements of the 
widget developed during the joint venture shall belong to Company A, 
then the grantback clause could create or further a monopoly. 144 Com-
pany A will hold the exclusive rights to both its original widget and 
any improvements that might result from the joint venture. 
Such a monopolistic agreement in a downstream venture can very 
easily affect price and output since one company is the gatekeeper of a 
product and faces no competition. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held this type of behavior to be a clear violation 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United 
Airlines, Inc. 145 The court stated that when a corporation owns an "es-
sential facility" 146 and has the power to eliminate competition in 
downstream markets through the control of that essential facility, the 
corporation violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 147 In the above 
example, the patent would be an essential facility. Through the grant-
back clause, Company A could restrict competition in the downstream 
market for its widget by denying others, even its joint venture partner, 
from independently practicing any improvements on the widget. 
Furthermore, even a non-exclusive grantback clause in a produc-
tion joint venture has the potential to harm competition. Where a 
grantback clause contemplates that both the original patentee and the 
licensee can independently practice any improvements, or license 
those improvements to third parties outside the joint venture, the 
grantback clause may facilitate a patent-holding cartel. 148 For exam-
ple, assume Company A licenses its key widget patent to a joint ven-
ture with Companies B and C, who have combined their resources to 
produce the widget and sell it to car manufacturers. If the joint venture 
144 Admittedly, this is a straw man argument because this is an exclusive 
grantback, which is generally held to be unlawful in most contexts. See Guidelines, 
supra note 48, at 30. But, the example is necessary to demonstrate a clear example of 
a grantback clause's potential to aid monopolistic behavior. 
145 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991). 
146 An essential facility is a resource that is a requirement of competition and 
cannot be easily duplicated. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass 'n. of St. Louis, 
224 U.S. 383, 392 (1912) (holding that defendants, who had exclusive control over 
railroad terminal facilities in St. Louis through which every train traveling east or 
west must pass, violated the Sherman Act by refusing their competitors access to the 
terminal on reasonable terms). 
147 Alaska Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d at 543 (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)). 
148 AREEDA, supra note 35, at ifl 782. 
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agreement provides that all three companies will have the right to 
independently practice any improvements or license those improve-
ments to others outside of the joint venture, with any licensing reve-
. nue to be shared by all three entities through the joint venture, then 
Companies A, B, and C could form a patent-holding cartel. 
While this arrangement may be more competitive because it al-
lows the companies to compete with one another outside of the joint 
venture by independently practicing any improvements, it may also be 
a spring board for cartelization. The three entities could coordinate the 
price or output of their independent practice, thereby restricting com-
petition in the market. 
Furthermore, such activity would be more difficult for competi-
tors to detect and for the courts and Agencies to enforce if the three 
entities do not formally agree on price or output, but instead merely 
conduct themselves parallel to one another. The United States Su-
preme Court has consistently held that parallel conduct, without more, 
does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 149 In Theatre Enter-
prise, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., the Court stated, 
"this Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior 
conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such 
behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense." 150 
Therefore, because a grantback clause, whether exclusive or non-
exclusive, may catalyze or increase the potentiality for monopolistic 
or cartelizing behavior in a downstream joint venture, courts and the 
Agencies should approach them more skeptically and retain a form of 
rule of reason analysis. Such analyses should look to the overall mar-
ket in which the joint venture exists and ask two key questions. The 
first question should analyze the market power of the joint-venturing 
firms. This inquiry should be borrowed from the Agencies' horizontal 
merger analysis. 151 Where the combined market share of the joining 
firms in the relevant product and geographic market is between fifty 
and seventy percent, the grantback clause should be analyzed to de-
termine whether its terms are likely to create a monopoly or restrict 
price or output through cartelized behavior. Only a non-exclusive 
grantback clause would survive this inquiry. An exclusive grantback 
clause in such a context should be per se unlawful because its re-
striction would likely lead to monopolization through patent pool-
149 Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 
(1954). 
150 Id. 
151 See Merger Guidelines, supra note 103, at 15 (detailing the Agencies' 
analysis of the market shares of merging firms). 
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ing. 152 The Agencies have held that where post-merger market share 
of the merged firms makes it the dominant player in the market, uni-
lateral conduct and coordinated conduct can have serious anticompeti-
tive effects on the market. 153 Such effects include ·price-fixing and 
reducing output. 
Second, courts and the Agencies should ask whether the grant-
back clause would facilitate barriers to entry by new market en-
trants. 154 Easy entry into a market by new competitors may alleviate 
anticompetitive effects of a patent grantback clause because the joint 
venturing firms would be hesitant to restrict price or output since a 
new entrant could displace them by lowering prices or increasing out-
put. Where the joint venture produces a new product in the market, 
entry barriers may be much greater because the patents for the new 
product held by the joint venture may be "essential facilities" in the 
market. But, where the joint venture produces a product that others 
also produce through different technology, market entry may be easier 
since a new market entrant can seek to license technology from anoth-
er firm that is not restricted by the joint venture. A non-exclusive 
grantback clause may survive this second inquiry regardless of wheth-
er the joint venture produces a new product absent any evidence that it 
would facilitate parallel conduct between the joint venturers, such as 
sharing profits from licenses to third parties. An exclusive grantback 
may survive this inquiry if the joint venture does not produce a new 
product, or the new product may be produced by competitors through 
equivalent technology that already exists in the marketplace. 
CONCLUSION 
Grantback clauses in patent license agreements are an important 
tool for patent-holders to protect themselves from licensees displacing 
them in the market through technological improvements. Yet, grant-
back clauses may also have anticompetitive effects on the markets in 
which they exist because they can reduce licensees' incentives to in-
novate, and they can lead to patent-holding monopolies or cartels. 
Federal courts and the Agencies have analyzed the anticompetitive 
152 See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 671-
73 (D.S.C. 1977) (prohibiting license agreements that required licensee to license all 
improvements back to licensor). 
153 Merger Guidelines, supra note 103, at 20-25. 
154 Id. at 27-28. 
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effects of such grantback clauses by mechanically applying either the 
per se rule or the rule of reason. 155 
But using either rule is deficient for grantback clauses because the 
per se rule mischaracterizes the procompetitive effects of grantback 
clauses in patent license agreements, and the rule of reason analysis 
unnecessarily consumes the resources of the parties, the agencies, and 
the judiciary, and gives little guidance to conscientious businesses. 
Instead of applying the per se rule or the rule of reason analysis in 
their traditional form, courts and the Agencies should tailor their in-
quiry to the context in which the grantback clause exists. By analogiz-
ing patent license agreements to joint ventures, the courts should de-
termine whether the grantback clause exists in an upstream joint ven-
ture or a downstream joint venture. Upstream joint ventures, such as 
research and development projects, have inherently less anticompeti-
tive effects than downstream joint ventures, and grantback clauses do 
not change that effect unless the grantback clause is exclusive. Thus, 
non-exclusive grantback clauses in upstream joint ventures should be 
presumptively legal, while exclusive grantback clauses should be 
scrutinized using traditional market-power analysis. 
On the other hand, downstream joint ventures, such as production 
joint ventures, have a greater potential for anticompetitive effects in 
the relevant market, and grantback clauses may further those effects. 
Exclusive grantback clauses in downstream joint ventures may cata-
lyze patent-holding monopolies, and thus should be presumptively 
illegal where the joint venture introduces a new product into the mar-
ket. Non-exclusive grantbacks may encourage patent-holding cartels 
through parallel conduct. Such grantback clauses should be scruti-
nized for their anticompetitive effects. Borrowing from the Agencies' 
traditional merger analysis, courts and the Agencies should evaluate 
the market share of the joint-venturing firms, as well as the ease of 
entry into the market by new competitors. This tailored analysis 
would allow courts and Agencies to get to the heart of grantback 
clauses' anticompetitive effects more quickly, thus saving the re-
sources usually spent in a full rule of reason analysis, and setting more 
clear and understandable precedent. 
155 Although the per se rule has not been applied since Transparent-Wrap 
Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., the Department of Justice called for the per se 
rule to be reintroduced to grantback clauses in 1960's. See supra notes 79-80 and 
accompanying text. 
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